Unfortunately for the green shoots crowd, the trend in residential real estate continues its downward spiral.
It's so out of control now, not even Sully Sullenberger could land this one safely.
And while sales may have turned up a tad in May according to the National Association of Realtors (NAR), the 800 lb. gorilla in the room is being largely ignored.
But there he sits, huge, hairy, and mean. And the bad news for the U.S. Housing Market is he's getting hungrier by the minute.
That's because the much bigger problem — for borrowers of all stripes — is actually the continuing decline in values that could reach as high as 36% from peak to trough.
The U.S. Housing Market's Heavy Chains
In fact, according to the NAR on Tuesday, the median price of an existing home fell to $173,000 in May from $207,900 only a year earlier.
That $34,900 drop in price left every single "median buyer" so deep underwater, their ears will soon pop.
So, sure, while low rates and tax credits may have brought some buyers in from the sidelines this spring, it will also chain a fair share of them to that big gorilla — an asset whose value is dropping like a rock.
For those willing to take on those heavy chains, the price of "ownership" is that some of them will find themselves hopelessly upside down as prices continue to slide. But at least they'll have plenty of company, since Zillow estimates 22% of all Americans are underwater on their mortgages.
That, of course, is a no-win situation for everyone involved, and it's the big reason why falling prices drive far more foreclosures than higher payments ever will.
After all, who wants to be chained to a gorilla?
In fact, according to a report last week from Fitch, home prices will fall by an additional 12.5% nationally and 36% in California, with home prices not exhibiting stability until the second half of 2010 — over a year from now.
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Lawrence Yun's Latest Boogeyman
That is a prospect that keeps the NAR's chief economist (read: shill) Lawrence Yun awake at night rubbing a Buddha's belly while clutching a rabbit foot. Even still, he hears noises under the bed and sees terrifying figures in the closet.
Yun's latest boogeymen are those awful appraisers who are now doing their jobs without the threat of coercion.
You see, when the housing market was still a land of winks and nods, an appraisers ability to "hit the number" was the only thing that kept the new orders rolling in. You either delivered the goods, or you were blackballed by the loan officers who hired you.
Because of that, appraisal fraud ran rampant, causing a portion of the big losses taxpayers are now being asked to eat.
This obvious conflict of interest has been corrected by new appraisal rules that went into effect on May 1. With a dose of sanity, the new rules now simply require lenders who sell loans to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to order their own appraisals, taking loan officers out of the crooked loop completely.
Restoring Integrity Means a Lower U.S. Housing Market
However, restoring actual integrity to the mortgage process is bad for both sales and home prices. And Yun knows it.
So, when honest appraisals start gumming up the works, Yun begins to scream bloody murder, forgetting that an independent price opinion is the cornerstone of sound lending.
"It's pointing to thousands of delayed or canceled transactions," Yun whined yesterday in response to low appraisals. "We've had a massive inundation from members saying this is a big problem."
To which the Appraisal Institute rightly responded, "We take offense with the notion that an appraisal is only good if it happens to come in at the sales price. That mentality helped cause the mortgage meltdown to begin with."
All of which reminds me of a nursery rhyme about an egg that fell from a pretty large height. No matter how hard they tried, all the king's horses and all the king's men couldn't put Humpty Dumpty back together again!
It really is that simple. Unless, of course, you are an insomniac named Lawrence Yun.
For some reason he still thinks he can tame an 800 lb. gorilla.
By the way, things have gotten so bad in the housing market lately that yesterday the S&P lowered its ratings on 102 classes from 33 U.S. prime jumbo residential mortgage-backed securities issued from 1998 to 2004. That's notable because these securities were previously thought to be safe, due to when they originated.
"The downgrades reflect our opinion that projected credit support for the affected classes is insufficient to maintain the previous ratings, given our current projected losses," S&P said in a statement.
Translation: Look out Below.
It kind of makes you yearn for the days when all this mess was supposedly confined to sub prime. Up the ladder the gorilla goes. . .
Your bargain-hunting analyst,
Steve Christ,
Investment Director, The Wealth Advisory
P.S. The collapse of residential real estate is just a preview of what is headed down the pike on the commerical side. Eighteen months later, it's lining up to be the next shoe to drop. To learn more about the brewing trouble in commercial real estate — and how to profit from it — click here.






old(swindle)days?
Before anyone jumps too quickly on the bandwagon of 'loan officers = crooked', it is helpful to better define the actual group in question. Recall that the HVCC system was set up because of WAMU's inside appraisers colluding with bundled vendor services for their Retail Loan Officers on valuations, not the wholesale broker channel. Outside of sub-prime loans, A-paper mortgages originated in the wholesale channel continue to perform better than most retail bank originated loan pools. A properly run wholesale channel has more checks and balances in place, and distance between underwriters and originators is greater. Originators submit a file and underwriters cross-check and confirm its content, as it should be. In the retail channel, all parties are working for same company, which historically allows for less resistance to challenging what is submitted, in any business model.
As for the HVCC system, on one hand, it would appear this system 'fixes' appraisal collusion, and it may, but it does not help the consumer in the long run. So far, it appears to damage the consumers more than helping them. The lack of appraisal portability is INCREASING the cost to already struggling consumers. It is resulting in 2 or 3 appraisal charges, and/or extra review appraisal fee charges. Reviewing an appraisal, and charging the consumer for it, who already paid for the appraisal that was done by the lender's chosen vendor, has collusion written all over it from a consumer protection view point.
The other side of the equation, and I don't intentionally offer defense for Yun's view, is that many, not the majority, but many appraisals are not being done by appraisers who know well the areas which they are being assigned by the appraisal management companies. Many appraisers are under duress for faster turn times and at lower profits. As an appraiser, if I paid you less money for an appraisal, would you rather spend time with your family and friends, or spend an extra two hours digging into comparable sales to be certain all angles were covered vs. just sending in the minimum work?
The HVCC concept is laudable at the high level. The devil is in the details, and those details are hampering a system, resulting in greater costs and less efficiencies to the consumer, who was supposed to be protected by this system. Unfortunately, it is once again big banking who appears to have more protection in the form of a shield to defer liability about any appraisal issues, vs. when they had their own appraisal staffs during the looser guideline days of 2002 thru 2007.
There are 3 sides to every story: his side, her side, and what really happened. Let's always try to focus on the latter, for everyone's best interest, especially the consumer.
PS/ By mistake with my fingers, my rating came up with 2 stars. I wanted ro rate it 5 stars. I am soory but I have arthritys in my fingers. I meant 5 stars!
Thanks so much for an outstanding,(5)(> exellent, (4)) article. Once again, you have honed in on a specific, textual issue within an overall subject area, further encompassed by sane context: production > consumption; investment > dievestment [sic]; earnings > extraction; dynamic capital > static capital; real wealth > nominal wealth; real economy > nominal market. Certain leverage applications are fine within context; after all, humanity is compelled toward progress, with capital investment a valuable tool (not overarching policy) toward that end, with seeking of answer to the ultimate existential question. Nevertheless, to the extent that tool malapplication over reasonable and balanced integral policy toward real (not nominal) progress debauches duty, honor, country, there is an acute problem. You guys, have once again, put your finger on a specific, that some of us not in the real property business, would otherwise have failed to consider. Your recent article regarding GS 5x volume play, early through mid Spring, was most enlightening, as well. Herein another specific: as possible treasury surrogate, loosely affiliated, under Executive Order 12631, signed into law Fr, 18 March, 1988 under then President Reagan, to ostensibly deal with some of Mo, 19 October, 1987 market aftermath, and issues, previous and contemporaneous, appertaining thereto. Specifically, thereunder: Sec. 2, exchange and other [private sector]financial agency representative response-report to 5 member Working Group (The President, Treasury Secretary, et al) within 60 days, "(and periodically thereafter)," "...its views on any legislative changes." (Perhaps of legal and otherwise research forensix [sic] merit). BTW, 10/19/1987 a nice trade: a priori evident via micro: market fluctuation-machination (ex: vol/pt mult, diff'l spread, dx, dy) and, macro-S/E activity late Summer, early Fall pre-event, certainly well prior to Mo trading day open -- early am EDT hours we took out an Iranian oil rig in the PG; Nikkei and yen had crashed...